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This paper investigates the association between 
board busyness (i.e., directors with multiple positions) 
and the occurrence of reported information security 
incidents. Building on prior studies of board busyness, 
this paper argues that directors holding multiple 
board seats may fail to commit the time and effort 
necessary to ensure the appropriate information 
security strategy or investment plans are in place. Our 
results demonstrate that board busyness is positively 
associated with reported information security 
incidents. This effect is larger when independent 
directors are busy, thus suggesting the importance of 
the governance role played by independent directors 
in managing information security risks. The board of 
directors’ role has been emphasized in anecdotal 
evidence and IT governance frameworks, but our 
study empirically demonstrates the board’s relevance 
in information security strategy and management. 
1. Introduction  
In the information security literature, the 
imperative role of top management to support the 
adoption and implementation of information security 
management has received well-acknowledged support 
[19, 21]. Nonetheless, with the increasing headlines 
reporting on data breaches and cyberattacks, there is a 
call that board-level information security governance 
assess information technology (IT)-related risks that 
can potentially have a catastrophic impact on 
organizational performance and operations [26, 33]. 
Anecdotal evidence from, for example, Deloitte, Ernst 
& Young (EY), and the International Association of 
Privacy Professionals (IAPP) highlights the board of 
directors’ importance regarding information security 
strategy and the potential damage to organizational 
performance in the event the board fails to perform its 
job of risk oversight.  Additionally, in late 2013, the 
US retailer Target experienced one of the largest data 
breaches in the industry, resulting in the resignation of 
the company’s chief executive officer (CEO) and a 
call from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) to 
oust several of Target’s directors on the board for their 
failure to ensure the appropriate management of 
information security risks. These developments are 
consistent with the message from the IT Governance 
Institute [23] claiming that boards of directors now 
bear a greater responsibility in ensuring the protection 
of information assets in organizations and establishing 
an appropriate governance strategy to meet the 
strategic business objectives and comply with 
regulatory compliance requirements. 
Given the importance of board-level governance 
for IT issues, emerging scholarly research develops a 
conceptual framework for board members’ role in IT 
governance [8, 37] or empirically investigates the 
effect of board-level IT governance on both directors’ 
perceived organizational, financial performance [44] 
and reported security breaches [20]. Turel and Bart 
[44] note that the board of directors is responsible for 
overseeing the management of an organization by 
“asking management questions about existing and 
potential IT risks” and “making sure risks are 
identified and monitored” (p.225). This perspective 
highlights the board of directors’ important 
organizational capability of endorsing security policy 
and ensuring the appropriate countermeasures are 
established against security risks.  
In this research, we claim that the board plays a 
crucial role in influencing how senior managers plan 
risk mitigation strategies and develop proactive 
cybersecurity practices. To further understand the 
board’s role in security governance, for the following 
reasons, this study extends the focus from the board 
structure to the concept of board busyness, which 
commonly refers to the number of multiple board 
appointments a director holds that consequently 
renders him/her too busy to adequately perform the 
monitoring function. Our perspective on busyness is 
rooted in the argument that limited attention 
capabilities and time constraints prevent a busy 
director from effectively performing the monitoring 
function. Although Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard 
[15] find no evidence of a negative association 
between multiple board appointments and corporate 





performance, Fich and Shivdasani [16] question the 
methodological design in Ferris, Jagannathan, and 
Pritchard [15], and their reexamination of empirical 
data indicates that multiple directorships are 
associated with weaker corporate governance. Fich 
and Shivdasani [16] finding is consistent with the 
policy recommendation from the National Association 
of Corporate Directors [43] that called for limits on the 
number of board seats held by directors. Jiraporn et al. 
[25] also find that busy directors have a higher 
tendency to be absent from board meetings. Thus, 
from the viewpoint of time allocation and monitoring, 
we argue that busy directors holding multiple board 
seats may fail to provide the time commitment 
required to participate in the company’s overall 
security strategy and governance.  
Second, Curry [8] posits that, in contrast with 
their understanding of other forms of risks, most board 
members do not possess expertise in cybersecurity 
risks; to overcome this obstacle, the recommendation 
is that the board actively engage in conversations with 
security leaders in the organization and include 
information security discussions in its meeting agenda. 
Additionally, as highlighted in a 
PricewaterhouseCoopers report, “boards can keep up 
to speed with effectiveness of the company’s security 
program by meeting regularly with the company’s top 
security owner, such as the Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) or the Chief Information Security Officer 
(CISO)”  (2015, p.1). Again, these viewpoints imply 
that effective information security governance 
requires the board’s commitment and efforts to engage 
in a management discussion, to understand the risk 
profile specific to its organization, to set the direction 
for risk management and security policy, and to 
monitor the information security program’s 
effectiveness. Overall, we believe that, in addition to 
board composition, board busyness is another feature 
that is highly relevant and worthy of investigating in 
the security governance context.  
Thus, our research objective is to empirically 
investigate the link between board busyness and the 
effectiveness of organizational information security. 
Similar to prior studies, we used the information 
security incidents report as an indicator for measuring 
the effectiveness of information security management 
[29]. Empirically, reported information security 
incidents were manually collected from DataLossDB , 
while board busyness was calculated using the 
eigenvector centrality measure in the network 
analysis. We also perform additional analyses by 
focusing on (1) the role of independent directors and 
(2) the source of the information security incidents.  
The paper is organized as follows: The next 
section reviews the existing literature on information 
security management and governance and the relevant 
theoretical background on board busyness and 
governance effectiveness. Section three presents our 
econometric model and research methodology. Next, 
we discuss the empirical results and conclude the 
paper with the theoretical and practical implications of 
this research. 
2. Theoretical background and hypothesis 
development 
In the first part of this section, we review and 
discuss the extant studies on information security 
management and governance. In particular, we focus 
on studies addressing the role of top management and 
the board in the design and implementation of 
information security programs. In part two, we discuss 
the association between board busyness and 
information security governance, followed by the 
development of the main hypotheses for our empirical 
analyses. 
2.1. Information security management and 
governance 
Within the literature, the primary focus has been 
placed on organizational end users and employees, 
such as user awareness and motivation [9, 27], 
information security policy compliance [5, 46, 49], 
and risk management [42]. In recent years, attention 
has also been shifted to the importance of top 
management in directing and shaping the 
implementation and consequences of information 
security management. From our perspective, studies 
such as [18, 21, 36] are significant because they 
demonstrate the importance of top management’s 
character in supporting the implementation of 
information security programs in an organization and 
shaping employees’ attitudes toward information 
security compliance. Nonetheless, from the 
information security governance perspective, the 
board of directors is another key group of actors who 
must understand the business risks and ensure they are 
adequately addressed. Their importance has been 
gradually reported and highlighted in a broader 
concept of IT governance, of which information 
security governance and risk management are an 
integral part [32, 34]. Nolan and McFarlan [33] were 
among the first to highlight the value of board 
oversight of IT investment strategy and corporate 
information asset risk management. Building on their 
early work on the IT strategic grid, Nolan and 
McFarlan [33] proposed that companies in different 
modes of the strategic grid should implement diverse 
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arrangements for board committees and their 
corresponding responsibilities. For example, 
companies in factory strategic modes require that their 
boards of directors conduct regular reviews of security 
effectiveness and reliability to avoid possible business 
interruptions and organizational crises. Nolan and 
McFarlan [33] suggest that these companies’ boards 
should question both the quality of business continuity 
planning against attack and the quality of management 
processes for ensuring a 24/7 service level. Andriole 
[1] also conducted a descriptive survey with more than 
fifty CIOs and found that CIO perception of board 
oversight for IT investment and project management 
is relatively low. Andriole [1] offers prescriptive 
recommendations for actions to increase board 
members’ level of engagement as well as the 
alignment of business and IT strategy at the board 
level. Turel and Bart [44] also determine that board-
level involvement in IT governance can influence 
organizational performance. They conclude that 
board-level IT governance is an important 
organizational capability for achieving strategic 
advantages and managing IT-associated risks. A 
similarly positive relationship between board IT 
governance and firm performance was also reported in 
studies by both Jewer and McKay [24]and Turel, Liu, 
and Bart [45].  
Emphasizing the concept of information security 
governance, Johnston and Hale [26] illustrate the 
discrepancy of information protection quality between 
those companies that implemented information 
security governance and those that did not. They found 
that for those organizations with information security 
governance in place, the reported executive 
management’s support is much higher. Parent and 
Reich [34] propose a framework of IT risk governance 
chain and dashboard to help the board more effectively 
govern IT-related risks such as infrastructure, 
information, and business continuity risks. Hsu and 
Wang [20] drew on the organizational demography 
perspective and conducted an exploratory study on the 
association between board structure and composition, 
such as board size, the heterogeneity of directors’ 
ages/tenures, and the possibility of security breaches. 
Hsu and Wang [20]indicate that security breaches are 
less likely to occur when the board is larger and the 
directors, on average, are older and possess longer 
organizational tenures.  
Overall, we find that the value and importance of 
board oversight of IT investment and security 
management have been widely recognized and 
discussed in practitioner-oriented publications and 
surveys [23, 41]. To address this gap, we next theorize 
and empirically test board busyness and its impact on 
information security breaches in organizations. 
2.2. Board busyness and information security 
management effectiveness 
Studies on upper management examine a variety 
of factors that might influence its effectiveness in 
performing these functions (e.g., the board’s 
composition). In our empirical research, we focus on 
another important feature called board busyness. As 
we briefly note in the introduction, multiple 
directorships can pose implications for the allocation 
of time and attention to effectively perform the 
monitoring function. Harris and Shimizu [17] explain 
that busy boards are “likely to threaten available 
preparation time for board meetings…time constraints 
may limit these directors’ ability to provide useful 
advice” (p. 777). We find this argument particularly 
salient in the information security governance context. 
When compared with general financial and managerial 
controls, this dimension of security knowledge is more 
organization specific [48] and requires that the board 
“be aware of the organization’s information assets and 
their criticality to ongoing business operations” (p.21) 
[23]. Rothrock, Kaplan, and Van der Oord [40] 
propose that the board involvement in cybersecurity 
discussion should not go beyond the yearly or 
semiannual reporting meetings. Namely regarding 
nontechnical board members that comprise the board’s 
majority, spending more time interacting with 
information security officers can greatly increase the 
knowledge and awareness of possible IT-related risks 
and breaches, which is consistent with Parent and 
Reich’s [34] argument that the boards should devote 
more time and effort to IT risk governance than they 
have in the past. 
Thus, increased board awareness implies greater 
demand from the board’s time for gaining a clear and 
full understanding of protecting corporate information 
assets and asking relevant questions about technology 
risks and current security practices. Further, increased 
board awareness might lead to an increase in the 
number or length of board meetings to allow for access 
to organizational knowledge. Jiraporn et al. [25] 
demonstrate that directors with more board seats have 
a greater tendency to be absent from board meetings. 
We believe such absences may pose implications for 
accessing organization-specific information that might 
be available during board meetings and may thus 
weaken the soundness of information security 
governance in a firm. Thus, we propose the following 
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Board busyness is negatively 
associated with the effectiveness of information 
security management. 
The corporate governance literature has also 
emphasized the distinction between independent 
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directors and insider directors. Scholars argue the 
independent director’s role is particularly important 
for enforcing the monitoring and oversight function of 
organizational performance [11, 28, 38]. Independent 
directors are more likely to have independent 
perspectives because they are outside directors rather 
than employees of or affiliated with the firm. Beasley 
[2] found a negative relation between the incidence of 
financial fraud and independent directors, while other 
studies have provided empirical support for the 
adverse impact on firm performance when 
outside/independent directors hold multiple board 
seats. For instance, Fich and Shivdasani [16] 
discovered that, when a majority of outside directors 
are busy holding three or more board seats, firms have 
weaker corporate governance.  Additionally, Falato, 
Kadyrzhanova, and Lel [13] suggests that investors do 
value independent directors’ efforts and time in 
governance oversight and that independent directors’ 
busyness is negatively related to firm value. Similarly, 
Liu, Wang, and Wu [30] found that independent 
directors’ attendance at board meetings plays an 
important role in investor protection.  
In the information security context, we contend 
that independent directors would be serving a more 
important function than insider directors in terms of 
monitoring the strategic position and implementing 
the information security program within an 
organization. Turel and Bart [44]also indicate that “the 
board can raise IT questions…and ultimately prevent 
opportunistic behaviors of management (e.g., ensure 
that the executive management team invests in proper 
IT security measures, rather than giving themselves a 
bonus)” (p. 227). However, aligning with our earlier 
argument on the time and attention required to gain 
familiarity with the cybersecurity practices in an 
organization, we argue that, when independent 
directors serve on multiple boards, there exist greater 
implications for the board’s decision quality in 
providing direction and oversight for information 
security programs compared to the board as a whole. 
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The negative association between 
the busyness of independent directors and the 
effectiveness of information security management is 
greater than that for the board as a whole. 
3. Data description and econometric 
model 
For our empirical analysis, we collected data 
regarding reported information security breaches, 
board busyness, and control variables. Please note that 
we only consider information security incidents 
reported by news articles, but not incidents detected by 
companies. 
3.1. Dependent variable 
Our study operationalized the effectiveness of 
information security management by using the 
realization of information security risks (i.e., reported 
information security incidents) because (1) the 
effectiveness of information security management is 
not observable by both insiders and outsiders [29] and 
(2) this approach has been commonly used in 
information security-related studies [29, 50] and 
operational risk management studies [47]. We 
collected reported information security breaches 
(denoted as BREACH) that were reported as 
information security incidents in news articles. 
BREACH is a dummy variable that equals one when a 
firm-year has reported information security breaches 
and zero otherwise. Specifically, we manually 
collected all reported information security incidents 
from DataLossDB (http://datalossdb.org/) including 
those from 2003 to 2013 in order to match what we 
have access for the board data. DataLossDB is 
operated by a nonprofit organization and states on its 
website that it collects breach information daily from 
news outlets including news feeds, blogs, and 
websites. For our analyses, we excluded the 
information security breaches of nonprofit 
organizations, government agencies, and firms that are 
not publicly traded. The information security incidents 
collected based on the above steps were all 
confidential. 
3.2. Independent variable 
We used the standard eigenvector centrality 
measure [3, 4, 12] from the network analysis to capture 
board busyness for each firm in our sample. 
Specifically, we used the measure to capture a network 
of firms through multi-position directors—those who 
hold positions on the boards of multiple firms. The 
eigenvector centrality measure is a comprehensive 
measure commonly used for a nondirectional network.  
Our measure is different from the average number of 
director positions held by all directors used in prior 
studies [15, 16] because we believe this method more 
appropriately captures how busy the board is both 
directly and indirectly. To calculate this measure, we 
gathered board information from the RiskMetrics 
database from 2003 to 2011. We only collected data 
up to 2011 due to data access limitations.  
Our method assigns a score (eigenvector 
centrality score) to all vertices (companies) in the 
network mentioned earlier. A high eigenvector score 
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means a vertex (a company) is connected to many 
other companies who also achieve high scores through 
multi-position directors. That is, the higher the value 
is, the busier the board of a company is because multi-
position directors exist and because other companies 
wherein a director holds multiple positions also have 
busy boards of directors. For our analyses, we 
considered two centrality measures: one calculated 
based on all a firm’s board directors (NET), and 
another calculated based solely on a firm’s 
independent directors (NET_INDE). 
3.3. Control variables 
We controlled the firm’s and board’s 
characteristics that have been demonstrated as being 
related to information security breaches in previous 
studies. Firm characteristics were gathered from 
Compustat, while board characteristics were collected 
from RiskMetrics. We considered firm size, 
performance, and growing opportunities for firm 
characteristics; firm size (SIZE) refers to the number 
of employees (in thousands). Previous studies [48] 
argue that, although larger firms may possess more 
effective control mechanisms regarding information 
security management than smaller firms, they may 
also be more likely to be targeted. We further control 
for performance and growing opportunities,  the 
former of which was defined as return-on-assets 
(ROA, net income of the firm divided by total assets) 
and the latter of which was captured through the 
market-to-book ratio (MB, market value of the firm 
divided by the common stockholders’ equity). For 
board characteristics, we considered board size 
(N_DIR), percentage of independent directors 
(P_INDE), the heterogeneity of directors’ ages 
(SD_AGE), and the heterogeneity of directors’ tenures 
(SD_TENURE). Board size, measured as the number 
of directors on the board, has been considered to be 
correlated with information security breaches because 
the board may (1) monitor the effectiveness of the 
firm’s information security management programs 
[22] and/or (2) guide the development and 
implementation of information security strategies 
[22]. In addition, previous studies [10] have reported 
that a nonlinear association may exist between board 
size and the effectiveness of information security 
management. Accordingly, in our analyses, we 
additionally consider the square of the board’s number 
of directors (N_DIRSQ). Independent directors are 
involved in corporate governance mechanisms and 
may ensure that information security risks are 
appropriately accounted for, which would reduce the 
possibility of information security incidents [14]. In 
our analyses, we controlled for the percentage of 
independent directors on the board. The heterogeneity 
of the directors’ ages is measured by the age variation 
coefficient, which equals the standard deviation of all 
directors’ ages divided by the average age of all the 
firm’s directors. The heterogeneity of the directors’ 
tenures is also measured by their variation coefficient 
(i.e., the number of years directors have worked for the 
firm), which equals the standard deviation of all 
directors’ tenures divided by the average tenure of all 
the firm’s directors. The heterogeneity of the 
directors’ ages and tenures may potentially affect the 
effectiveness of a firm’s risk management [47]. 
Finally, year and industry effects were also controlled. 
We then merged the following three sets of data: 
information security incidents, board connectedness, 
and control variables. The resulting sample size is 
11,642 firm-event observations; among these, 11,387 
firm-event observations lack information security 
events, while 255 firm-event observations possess 
information security incidents. This rare event 
characteristic is consistent with what previous studies 
identified [48]. We then reperformed our analyses 
using a matched sample in the section entitled 
Additional Analyses. 
3.4. Econometric model 
We tested our hypotheses with Equation (1), 
which was estimated using the logistic regression 
model after controlling for industry- and year-fixed 
effects with a firm’s clustered standard errors [35].  
BREACH = β0 + β1Busyness + βjControl + ΣYear + 
ΣIndustry + ε           (1) 
Busyness represents either NET or NET_INDE, 
while Control represents the control variables defined 
earlier. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Main findings 
The year and industry breakdowns show that 
more reported information security incidents in recent 
years and more incidents for industries with one-digit 
SIC codes “5” (wholesale and retail trade), “6” 
(finance, insurance, and real estate), and “7” 
(services). The descriptive statistics of the variables 
show that, on average, comprises nine board directors 
(N_DIR) wherein approximately 75% are independent 
directors (P_INDE). The firm size (SIZE), on average, 
is approximately 19,000 employees. For firms with 
and without reported information security incidents, 
all variables are significantly different at a 1% level. 
Specifically, firms without reported security incidents 
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have a lower level of centrality (i.e., the directors are 
less busy), fewer directors (N_DIR), fewer 
independent directors (P_INDE), and are smaller in 
size (SIZE). No large correlations that may affect our 
analyses were observed. 
The main results are provided in Table 1, wherein 
four models based on Equation (1) reveal how our 
results may vary with the inclusion or exclusion of 
variables. Please note that the year- and industry-fixed 
effects are included although not reported in Table 1, 
and all significance levels are two-sided. Model (1) 
only considers the association between board busyness 
(NET) and the occurrence of information security 
breaches (BREACH). The result demonstrates that 
board busyness (NET) is positively associated with 
BREACH (coefficient = 6.855, p < 0.01), suggesting 
that, when the firm’s board is busier (i.e., when the 
board member holds more positions), the likelihood of 
information security incidents increases based on our 
logistic regression model (Greene 2012). 
Model (2), Model (3), and Model (4) consider 
board busyness with board characteristics and, in 
Model (4), additional control variables. The results 
indicate that board busyness (NET) is significantly and 
positively associated with the likelihood of 
information security incidents (3.412, p < 0.01); that 
is, when the board member is busier (i.e., she/he holds 
more positions),  the log-odds of having a breach 
increase by approximately 3.412. Similarly, board 
busyness as measured by independent directors 
(NET_INDE) is also positively associated with the 
possibility of information security breaches (2.728, p 
< 0.01); that is, when the independent board members 
are busier, the log-odds of having a breach increase by 
approximately 2.728. Specifically, and as we 
discussed earlier, information security risk is 
idiosyncratic to individual firms [48]. To more 
effectively manage information security risks, a 
thorough understanding of IT resources, operations, 
and the firm’s specific needs is required. From this 
viewpoint, busy directors, although they may be 
equipped with industry knowledge and possess a 
broader understanding of emerging threats, may not 
devote enough effort to a specific firm, which may 
hinder the effectiveness of information security 
management as captured by reported information 
security incidents in our analyses. The findings 
consistently demonstrate that larger firms (SIZE) are 
more likely to experience reported information 
security breaches. In addition, board size (N_DIR) is 
positively associated with the possibility of 
information security breaches (coefficients = 0.470 
and 0.486, respectively, p < 0.05). Such findings 
suggest that larger boards may be less effective in 
communicating and coordinating, which subsequently 
affects the effectiveness of information security 
management. However, this is not a linear association 
(the squared term, N_DIRSQ, is -0.019, p < 0.05); the 
nonlinear association suggests that either a relatively 
small or large board is more effective in managing 
information security risks than is a medium-sized 
board. We discuss our main results in the next section. 
 






























































ROA    -1.303 
(-1.24) 
MB    0.028 
(0.93) 
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 10,852 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.20 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 (two-tailed test), z statistics are in 
parentheses and are estimated with firm clustered standard errors as 
in Petersen (2009). All models include industry- and year-fixed 
effects, although the results are not presented. 
4.2. Additional analyses 
In this subsection, we first consider whether board 
busyness is related to reported information security 
breaches with different sources of the incident (i.e., 
whether the reported information security incident is 
caused by insiders or outsiders). Untabulated findings 
demonstrate that, when the reported breach is caused 
by insiders, the association between board busyness 
(NET) is significantly larger than when it is caused by 
outsiders (i.e., 3.345 vs. 2.893, χ2 = 106.93, p < 0.01),. 
We also discuss this result in the following section.  
We further investigate whether our results are 
affected by governance or high-technology industries. 
For governance, it is possible a firm with a stronger 
governance environment is less likely to be affected by 
board members’ busyness. To examine this 
possibility, we gathered the governance score from 
Bloomberg and reperformed our analyses. The 
findings are consistent with our expectation.  
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Regarding high-tech companies, information 
security management is more inherent to their business 
operations. For high-tech companies, a busy board 
may have a smaller impact on information security 
management than other industries. To reperform our 
analyses, we employed Chemmanur, Loutskina, and 
Tian [7] definition claiming high-tech industries are 
the companies in the following three-digit SIC codes: 
357, 366, 367, 372, 381, 382, and 384. Our results are 
consistent with our expectations. 
Additionally, we consider the following diverse 
settings of our model to further validate our results. 
First, busy boards may be endogenous. However, 
choosing the appropriate instrumental variables is 
challenging because (a) prior studies lack clear 
guidance, (b) most firm characteristics are 
theoretically related to both board business and 
information security to some extent, and (c) many firm 
characteristics have mixed associations with 
information security breaches. Accordingly, we 
choose total assets and industry membership as our 
instrumental variables in the first stage. Specifically, 
total assets and industry membership may be 
indicators of a busy board, but they are not clear 
indicators of information security breaches from a 
theoretical perspective. In addition, total assets are not 
highly correlated with existing size measures (number 
of employees; correlation coefficient = 0.48). Given 
that we cannot find strong instrumental variables for 
the first stage from a theoretical perspective, we rely 
on a statistical test for weak instruments. The first-
stage model is estimated by the ordinary least squares 
model, while the second-stage model remains the 
logistic regression model. In particular, the test first 
demonstrates that we reject the weak instrument 
hypothesis (χ2 = 27.32, p < 0.01). In addition, the 
partial R2 and F-statistic equal 0.08 and 15.52 (p < 
0.01), respectively, further suggesting the instrumental 
variables are not weak. The main results remain 
similar and thus further validate our main analysis.  
Second, we consider performance  and growing 
opportunity as additional control variables, for which 
our main results remain similar. Third, we also use 
lagged independent variables in our model (i.e., breach 
is at time t + 1, while independent variables are at time 
t), and our main results remain similar. Fourth, our 
results may also be affected by a potentially biased 
sample; that is, firms with a reported security breach 
may exist in specific industries and may be larger in 
size. Therefore, we formed a control group using one-
to-one propensity score matching with the nearest 
neighbor algorithm. To achieve this, we first regressed 
BREACH on SIZE, industry, and year using a logistic 
regression model. From the model, the propensity 
score (conditional probability of having information 
security breaches) is calculated, the nearest neighbor 
(control group with the smallest gap of propensity 
compared to the event group) is identified, and the 
resulting sample size becomes 491 observations. We 
then reperformed our analyses and the main results are 
similar.  
In addition to quantitative analyses, we conducted 
seven interviews—two with senior security 
consultants who possess extensive experience in 
information security governance, three with the listed 
companies’ CIOs who reported to the board on IT and 
cyber security issues, and two with the listed 
companies’ board members—to gain insights 
concerning the board’s role in information security 
governance and the implication of board busyness. 
Interviews with practitioners also serve as a method 
for applicability checks [39, 44]. In the interviews, we 
briefly described our work and asked interviewees 
about both their thoughts on the research findings and 
their personal experiences with or observations of 
board busyness and information security governance. 
We coded the interviews based on the role of board in 
information security governance and in particular, the 
implications of board busyness on the effectiveness of 
information security management in organizations.   
All our interviewees were consistent in their 
viewpoints concerning the increasing importance of 
board involvement in security governance, and one 
CIO commented, “Continuous organizational 
investment in technology, employee awareness, 
training programs and IT professional skills is needed 
for good organizational security. Without strong 
support from the board, the security initiatives and 
investment may suffer when competing with resources 
with other business growth-driven initiatives.” 
We also asked our interviewees about the 
mechanisms through which the board gains familiarity 
with the firm’s security practices. Most interviewees 
considered engaging in conversations with security 
experts or CIOs and having security risk management 
progress reports on board meeting agendas as crucial 
practices. Speaking from his own experiences working 
with board members, one senior consultant stressed 
that, if a board director is busy and misses a board 
meeting, he or she will miss the opportunity to 
“understand and ask the right questions about security 
risks.” Interestingly, one CIO from a listed IT 
company further suggested that the inclusion of cyber 
security expertise on the board would be the fastest 
way to educate other board members about 
information security governance.  
To enrich our quantitative findings on the impact of 
independent directors, we also asked the interviewees 
to comment on the role of independent directors. One 
interviewee who serves as an independent director for 
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a financial company and holds multiple board seats 
claimed: “To understand IT security risk better, 
independent directors need to be on both the audit and 
risk management committees. I believe that the 
frequency with which these directors attend the 
meetings can be an important indicator of good 
governance in organizations. Now, technology affects 
every aspect of business operations. I would also 
suggest that independent directors should have a 
regular dialog with CIOs to understand the security 
risks in the context of the business operation. I often 
find these conversations very useful.” 
In short, we consider that the above qualitative 
findings extend the support for our argument on the 
time and attention required for the board to acquire 
security risk knowledge and to effectively perform the 
information security monitoring function. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This study has examined the relationship between 
board busyness and the effectiveness of information 
security management in organizations. Our findings 
have demonstrated that, when a board employs 
directors who hold multiple board seats, the likelihood 
of reported information security incidents is higher. 
Furthermore, our results provide evidence of a 
significant and positive correlation between 
independent directors’ busyness and the possibility of 
reported information security incidents.  
We believe our research findings offer important 
theoretical contributions to information security 
strategy and governance research in modern 
organizations. First, the focus on information security 
management has been predominantly centered on 
mechanisms that enforce user compliance and 
awareness. Among these mechanisms, a number of 
studies have pointed to the value of top management 
involvement in and support of the implementation of 
an information security program [21]. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, a limited number of studies 
have examined the relevance of the board of directors 
in information security strategy and governance. Much 
of the relevant work is available in practitioner-
oriented frameworks or guideline-related publications 
[22]. In this research, we integrate the practical 
viewpoints with a theoretical grounding from the 
corporate governance literature. With this foundation, 
we extend the notion of top management support to the 
board level by discussing information security 
governance. From the standpoint of risk oversight, we 
draw on the board busyness concept and examine its 
impact on the effectiveness of information security 
management in organizations. Our findings help 
reinforce the practitioner viewpoint by offering 
evidence of the linkage between board busyness and 
the likelihood of information security breaches. We 
believe further quantitative or qualitative studies may 
be conducted to analyze how interaction and 
collaboration between the board and management 
team might strengthen information security 
governance and oversight. Another interesting study 
might involve analyzing the impact of board support 
on employee compliance, attitude, and behavioral 
intention. Future research may also look into broad IT 
competency and the effectiveness of information 
security governance.  
In addition, the practical implications of our 
findings lend support to Nolan and McFarlan’s [33] 
suggestion to establish an IT governance committee 
work on the role of a board-level technology 
committee. Our study provides practical guidance to 
boards and management teams in several ways; for 
example, Nolan and McFarlan [33] propose that a 
company should “select appropriate members and the 
chairman and determine the group’s relationship to the 
audit committee” (p. 8). However, we believe the level 
of board busyness is a unique contribution to the 
consideration of board member selection based on this 
proposal. Our work demonstrates that a busy board 
member might not have the time and commitment 
required to understand and evaluate the process of 
information security planning and implementation. 
Furthermore, as exemplified in our interviews with 
practitioners, for effective information security 
governance, board members must develop 
organization-specific knowledge and analyze the 
formal and regular reports from relevant functions. All 
these endeavors require a greater amount of effort and 
time. Therefore, other than a board member’s 
technical knowledge, we recommend that, when 
appointing an IT governance committee, attention 
should be paid to the number of multiple board 
appointments a director holds.  
Second, our findings can bring research attention 
to the corporate governance area. Studies in this area 
have previously focused on the relation between board 
busyness and organizational performance. Our 
empirical results highlight that an evaluation of how 
well the board performs its monitoring and oversight 
function should not be narrowly confined to the scope 
of its financial and operational performance. Given 
advances in technology and regulatory compliance, 
our study adds a new dimension to the discussion of a 
board governance’s performance and risk 
management role. We believe our exploratory findings 
shed new light on how organizations understand and 
assess the board’s value with a broader scope. 
Furthermore, board member composition studies have 
indicated the significance of independent directors in 
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corporate governance and oversight. From the 
perspective of agency cost, our empirical results offer 
support to the argument that the independent director 
is an important mechanism for ensuring organizations 
have appropriate measures established to react to any 
threats to corporate information or assets.  
Third, our additional analysis offers another 
interesting and important finding from the perspective 
of insider and outsider attacks. Previous studies have 
highlighted the importance of employees’ compliance 
with information security policy, as noncompliance 
can impose financial costs upon an organization [6]. 
Our literature review demonstrates that the extant 
studies have focused on the antecedence or 
effectiveness of factors that might instigate 
employees’ compliance intentions and behaviors at the 
employee level [31, 42]. In this research, we raise the 
level at which this issue is examined by focusing on 
the value of board oversight in reducing the likelihood 
of an insider attack. We extend support to the 
dominant view regarding the board of directors’ 
crucial role in shaping information security culture and 
call attention to strengthening security governance at 
the board level for internal security policy compliance.  
However, some research limitations exist. First, 
the completeness of security breach data and director 
data is limited—a shortcoming we addressed by 
conducting interviews with practitioners. Second, 
similar to previous studies, our study is unable to 
directly capture how a director with multiple positions 
allocates his/her time and efforts. Future research may 
employ qualitative case studies to enhance the 
understanding in different contexts. Third, information 
security breaches can differ in type and total losses. 
However, our study is limited to incidents involving 
confidential information. Fourth, our study is unable 
to control for firms’ security policies and the 
compliance issues, which may be an important 
consideration for future studies. Fifth, decisions 
regarding information security management involve 
all related parties in an organization, which may be 
investigated in future studies.  
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